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Abstract:  This paper develops a general equilibrium model to study how the 
“exorbitant advantage” works, whether it is sustainable, and what may be the 
consequences if it is removed.  Its main findings are: (1) the center country that issues 
the reserve currency enjoys the “exorbitant advantage” in the sense that her current 
account deficit can be financed by the periphery country’s reserve holdings. The 
“exorbitant privilege” is predicated on the overvaluation of the reserve currency 
caused by a higher rate of money growth in the center country; (2) the “exorbitant 
advantage” is not likely to be sustainable in the long run; (3) if the “exorbitant 
advantage” is removed, the value of the reserve currency will depreciate, the terms of 
trade will change against the periphery country and sector composition will change in 
favour of the tradable sector in the center country and in favour of the non-tradable 
sector in periphery country.  These changes will be more pronounced if the center 
country repays her debt by printing money instead of raising taxes.   
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1.  Introduction 
The term “exorbitant privilege” was coined in 1965 by  the  then  French Minister 
Valery Giscard d’Estaing to describe the US’s unique ability to finance large external 
deficits (Gourinchas and Rey, 2005). The French economist Jacques Rueff  (1971) 
explains the working of the exorbitant privilege as follows: 
“…when a country with a key currency runs a balance-of-payment deficit - that 
is to say, the United States, for example - it pays the creditor country dollars, 
which end up with the latter's central bank. But the dollars are of no use in Bonn 
or in Tokyo or in Paris. The very same day, they are reloaned to the New York 
money market, so that they return to the place or origin. Thus the debtor country 
does not lose what the creditor country has gained. So the key-currency country 
never feels the effect of a deficit in its balance of payments. And the main 
consequence is that there is no reason whatever for the deficit to disappear, 
because it does not appear.” (p.78) 
Rueff (1971) argues that the American balance-of-payment deficits (over the 1950s) 
he analyses was not brought about by the United States; rather it was “the outcome of 
an unbelievable collective mistake” (p.24), namely, the adoption of the Bretton 
Woods System of gold-exchange standard which accepts the US dollar as a substitute 
for gold as reserves.  In Rueff’s words,  
“By accepting this substitution, the banks of issue put themselves in a position 
of being able to lend immediately to the United States, wholly or in part, the 
dollars they received in settlement of American balance-of-payments 
deficits. … 3 
 
To the extent that the new system was applied, it in fact released the United 
States from the obligation of settling its foreign debts. Thus the United States 
was in a position to lend, to give, and even to buy outside its own frontiers 
without having to worry about its own capacity.” (p.65) 
More generally, Rueff (1971) contends that the gold-exchange standard “allowed the 
countries in possession of a currency benefiting from international prestige to give 
without taking, to lend without borrowing and to acquire without paying.” (p.23) 
  Fifty years on, the Bretton Woods System that Rueff criticizes has long broken 
down, but the US appears to continue to enjoy the “exorbitant privilege” as evidenced 
by its apparent ease in acquiring foreign debts to finance its persistent current account 
and fiscal deficits. This “exorbitant privilege”, as Rueff might argue, is attributable to 
the “international prestige” that the US dollar possesses.  Besides being the main 
vehicle currency in foreign exchange markets, the main invoice currency for 
international trade, the US dollar is the most important reserve currency and the US 
Treasury securities are widely held by  central banks around the world as official 
exchange reserves. Given the US dollar’s dominant position and the fact that the US 
dollar is no longer tied to gold, the current international monetary order is referred to 
as the “dollar standard” (McKinnon, 2001). A notable feature of the dollar standard in 
recent decades is that some fast growing Asian countries (including those that have 
officially adopted  floating exchange rate systems) choose to fix the value of their 
local currencies against the US dollar (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). The outcome of 
these unilateral choices of exchange rate policies resembles the arrangement under the 
Bretton  Woods system of fixed exchange rates, thus  Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, & 4 
 
Garber (2004) characterise it as the “Revived Bretton Woods system”, with the US 
being the “center country” and Asia in the “periphery”.  
  How does the “exorbitant privilege” work under the “Revived Bretton Woods 
system”? Is the system sustainable? What might happen to the real economies of the 
world should the centre country lose its “exorbitant privilege”? These are the 
questions this paper attempts to tackle. To answer these questions,  we develop a 
simple two-country, three-good trade model with money.  The setup of our model is  
similar to that in Lucas (1982) and Stockman & Dellas (1989), but our model makes 
four  specific  assumptions to characterise  some stylised features of the “Revived 
Bretton Woods system”: (1) the currency of the centre country (the “dollar”) is the 
medium of exchange used in international trade and is the reserve currency of the 
periphery country; (2) the periphery country’s currency is pegged to the dollar, with 
the peg maintained by the periphery country’s intervention in the foreign exchange 
market; (3) the periphery country’s foreign exchange reserves are invested in country 
2’s government bonds with no well-defined date of net repayment; and (4) the funds 
raised from the government bond issue are given to the citizens of the center country 
as transfer payments. 
  Based on our model, we come to three main conclusions. First, the centre 
country that issues the reserve currency has the “exorbitant privilege” in the following 
sense:  once the center country’s current account deficits translates into increases in 
reserves of the periphery country, the increased reserve is reinvested in the center 
country, thus the center country’s deficits are more or less automatically funded. 
However, having access to automatic funding does not mean that the center country 
will necessarily run a current account deficit. The presence of a current account deficit 5 
 
is an indication that the currency of the centre country is overvalued.  The 
overvaluation may be caused by a higher rate of money growth in the centre country 
or  by  a desire on the part of the periphery country to devalue its currency for 
mercantilist purposes or to increase its reserves for precautionary considerations. This 
finding supports Aizenman’s (2010) contention that it is a fallacy to regard global 
imbalance as a “necessary requisite and consequence” (p.23) of the dollar standard. It 
is also broadly consistent with the casual observation that the  increase in global 
imbalances during the years prior to the global financial crisis of 2008 coincided with 
both an easy monetary policy environment in the US and a fast rate of official reserve 
accumulation in Asia.  
   Second, if international trade is balanced, reserves in the periphery country do 
not change, the center country does not utilise its “exorbitant privilege” although it 
continues to benefit from the existing reserves invested by the periphery country. If 
the policies of the center country or the periphery country or both make the dollar 
overvalued, trade imbalance will occur. The imbalance cannot be sustained in the long 
run because a  sustained imbalance requires  chronic  overvaluation of the reserve 
currency  which  undermines the standing  of  the dollar as a reserve currency.  
Moreover, a lasting trade imbalance leads to an accumulation of debt in the center 
country  and an accumulation of reserves in the periphery country  to increasingly 
undesirable levels.  It also leads to  a change in sector composition  in  the center 
country in favour of the non-tradable sector.  
  Third, if the “exorbitant privilege” were to be removed in the sense that the 
demand for the dollar as a reserve currency falls significantly  and the periphery 
country withdraws (a part of) its reserves invested in the center country, the dollar 6 
 
would fall in value, the terms of trade would change against the periphery country and 
the sector composition would change in favour of the tradable sector in country 2 and 
the non-tradable sector country 1. The dollar depreciation and country 1’ terms of 
trade deterioration would be more drastic, but the changes in sectoral composition 
would be less pronounced if the centre country chose to repay its debt by “printing 
money” instead of raising taxes. 
  Our paper connects with three related strands of literature. The first literature 
concerns the “exorbitant privilege”.  Gourinchas and Rey  (2005)  find that the US 
enjoys an “exorbitant privilege” in the sense that US’s return on its external assets 
was notably higher than foreigners’ return on US liabilities for over half a century 
since the early 1950s. Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2010)  further argue that the 
“exorbitant privilege” comes with an “exorbitant duty” as indicated by a substantial 
worsening of US foreign asset position during the recent global financial crisis when 
there was a net selling of US external assets.  Gourinchas  et al.’s  definition of 
exorbitant privilege is somewhat different from ours since they emphasise the excess 
return of US external assets whereas we focus on the center country’s ability to obtain 
automatic funding for its external deficits. However our analysis points to an 
explanation for the excess return of US external assets, namely that, government 
policies under the dollar standard can  create  a powerful force that draws large 
amounts of official reserves from periphery countries to the US. Since safety is the 
main concern for the owners of official reserves, the reserves are typically invested in 
low-risk  low-yield government securities. In contrast, US investments overseas 
involve higher risks and enjoy higher returns.  7 
 
  Secondly, our paper relates to the literature concerning the direction of 
international capital flows. The flow of official reserves from the poor periphery to 
the rich center country in our model constitutes a significant part of the “global saving 
glut”  which  Bernanke  (2005, 2007)  suggests  may  be a contributing factor to the 
global financial crisis. The direction of capital flow in our paper is also consistent 
with the empirical findings documented by Lucas (1990) and Alfaro et al. (2008).   
  Thirdly, our paper contributes to the ongoing debate  on the causes and 
implications of the  global imbalances.  On the optimistic side of the debate, it is 
argued that the imbalances may be an equilibrium outcome resulting from the fact that 
different regions of the world differ in their capacity to generate financial assets from 
real investments (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008). It is further suggested that 
the pattern of global capital flow associated with the imbalances may be “optimal” 
from the emerging economy’s perspective of developing a competitive tradable goods 
sector (Dooley and Garber, 2007). On the pessimistic side, there are concerns that the 
global imbalances cannot be sustained and that its eventual correction may trigger a 
dollar crisis and  impose substantial adjustment costs on the world economy. For 
instance, Blanchard, Giavazzi, & Sa (2005) argue that the increases in US demand for 
foreign goods and in foreign demand for US assets are behind the US current account 
deficits. They predict that the current account deficit must be reversed in the future 
accompanied by a substantial depreciation of the US dollar. Similarly, Obstfeld & 
Rogoff (2005) present a model of an adjustment process through which global balance 
is returned by a change of demand for tradable  versus non-tradable and domestic 
versus foreign goods. They also predict a large depreciation of the US dollar. The 
conclusions of our paper are closer to the pessimistic view of the debate. However, 8 
 
our focus is on the role of the US dollar as the reserve currency and the ramifications 
of government policies in both the center country and the periphery for the global 
imbalances.   
   
2.   A Model of the “Exorbitant Privilege” 
Consider a world with  two countries, country 1 (the periphery country) with a 
population of N1  and country 2 (the centre  country) with a population of N2. 
Individuals in both countries derive utility from consuming three goods X, Y and Z 
over a time horizon T. Good X is produced in country 1, good Y is produced in 
country 2 and good Z is a non-tradable good produced in both countries. Domestic 
trade is mediated by each country’s domestic currency, the “yuan” in country 1 and 
the “dollar” in country 2; and international trade is meditated by the dollar. As a result, 
consumers in country 1 have to purchase “dollars” to pay for imported good Y, so 
their budget constraint has a domestic currency component and a foreign exchange 
component. In contrast, consumers in country 2 only use dollars. The yuan-dollar 
exchange rate is fixed at e  and country 1’s central bank maintains this rate by buying 
or selling dollars in the foreign exchange market if necessary. 
  We assume that all of country 1’s foreign exchange reserves are in dollars and 
are invested in one-period bonds issued by the government of country 2 (at an 
exogenously determined interest rate i). Bond repayments are financed by new bond 
issues. The funds raised by issuing bonds are distributed to country 2’s consumers in 
transfer payments.    
  The decision problem of a representative consumer in country 1 is: 
1, 1 1 1
1
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subject to the budget constraint: 
domestic currency: 
1 1 11 xt t z t t t It p x p z w eFX += − ,       
foreign exchange:  1 yt t It p y FX = . 
  The decision problem for a representative consumer in country 2 is: 
 















++ ∑              ( 123 1 ααα ++= ),       (2) 
subject to the budget constraint: 
2 2 2 22
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++= + . 
In the above decision problems, subscript t denotes time t and subscript i (i=1, 2) 
denotes country i;  it x , it y ,  it z are  quantities of goods X, Y and Z  consumed; 
xt p , yt p ,
i zt p are money prices of goods X, Y and Z denominated in the currency of the 
country of production;  it w is  the wage rate;  It FX  is the foreign exchange (dollars) 
purchased in the foreign exchange market to pay for imports (good Y); e is the fixed 
exchange rate;  Gt FX is the amount of dollars purchased by country 1’s central bank in 
order to maintain the exchange rate at e . Since  Gt FX represents an increase in 
reserves and the reserves are invested in country 2’s government bond,  2 / Gt FX N is 
the per person transfer payment from the country 2’s government funded by its bond 
issue.   
  On the supply side, producers in country 1 produce goods X and Z using the 
following technologies:  
1 11 t x xt X aL = ,  1 11 t z zt Z aL = ,                   (3) 
where  1xt L and  1zt L are labor devoted to producing goods X and Z in country 1.  10 
 
  Under the assumption of perfect competition, the following conditions hold:  
11 1 11 0 zt zt t t z t p Z wL π =−= ,                             (4) 
1 1 1 11 1 () xt t z t t t xt zt Gt p X p Z w L L FX e + − +=                (5) 
Equation (4) is a standard zero-profit condition. Equation (5)  stipulates  that the 
difference between country 1’s total value of production and its total value of 
consumption is the value of trade surplus, which is equal to the amount of the foreign 
exchange purchase by the central bank. If trade is balanced,  Gt FX  is zero. If country 1 
has a trade surplus, country 1’s central bank buys Gt FX dollars (with  Gt FX e  yuan), 
invests the same amount in country 2’s government bonds, enabling country 2 to 
finance its trade deficit.  
  In country 2, producers make goods Y and Z using the following technologies: 
2 22 t y yt Y aL = ,  2 22 t z zt Z aL = .                  (6) 
Perfect competition implies:  
2 22 0 yt yt t t yt pZ wL π = −= , 
22 2 22 0 zt zt t t z t p Z wL π =−= .          (7) 
  The market clearing conditions in the economy are summarised below. 
(1) The markets for good Z: 
11 1 tt Nz Z = ,  22 2 tt Nz Z = .                   (8) 
 (2) The market for good X:  
11 22 1 1 1 t t t x xt Nx Nx X a L += = .                  (9) 
(3) The market for good Y:  
11 22 2 2 2 t t t y yt N yN yYa L += =  .                (10) 
 (4) Labor markets:   
11 1 xt zt LLN += ,  22 2 yt zt LLN += .             (11) 11 
 





N FX FX N x
e
+= .                 (12) 
The left-hand side of equation (12) is the sum of private demand for dollars (to pay 
for imports) and central bank’s purchase of dollars; the right hand side is country 1’s 
dollar earnings from exports.   
 (6) Money markets: 
Strictly speaking, there are no separate markets for money – money, as the medium of 
exchange, features in all markets. In country 1, money supply is affected by 
government intervention in the foreign exchange market, but the government can still 
choose a rate of money growth  1 π (although this will affect the amount of foreign 
exchange intervention required to maintain a given exchange rate). The time path of 
money supply for country 1 is described by:   
1 1 1( 1) (1 ) t t Gt m m FX e π − = ++ ,                (13) 
where  1t π is a measure of money growth rate (on the basis of last period’s money 
supply, excluding growth due to foreign exchange market intervention);  Gt FX e is the 
increase in the quantity of money due to foreign exchange market intervention, 
assuming no sterilisation.  
  After a foreign exchange market intervention, country 1’s reserve holdings are:   
1 (1 ) t Gt t R FX i R − = ++ ,                (14) 
where  1 t R − is the reserve holdings in the previous period, and i  is the (exogenous) 
interest rate paid on country 2’s government bonds. 
  The total money supply is equal to the total wage income in each country:  
1 11 tt m Nw = ,    2 2 2( 1) 2 2 (1 ) t tt m m Nw π − = += ,            (15) 12 
 
where  2t π is the rate of money growth in country 2. 
  Solving the consumers’ decision problems (1) and (2), and applying zero 
profit conditions and market clearing conditions, we obtain the solutions for all 
endogenous variables in the model, which are presented in Table 1.
1    Based on the 
model outlined above and the solutions presented in Table 1, we now attempt to 
answer the questions set out in the introduction section, namely, how the “exorbitant 
privilege” works, whether it is sustainable, and what would likely  happen to the 
economies of both the center and the periphery if it were removed. 
 
3.  Analysis 
3.1.   How does the “exorbitant privilege” work?  
In our model, the “exorbitant privilege” is characterised as the central country’s 
ability to obtain automatic funding for its trade deficit because the dollar is the 
periphery country’s reserve currency and the reserves are invested in the center 
country’s government bonds. By this characterisation, the “exorbitant privilege” is 
only utilised when country 2 runs a trade deficit which is funded by country 1’s 
increase in reserves, that is, when  0 Gt FX > . From Table 1, we have: 
1 2 2( 1) 2 1 1( 1)
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which implies,  
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1 These solutions describe a temporary “state of rest” in the sense that consumers behave optimally and 
markets clear; they are not real equilibrium solutions as external trade is not balanced. There is a 
market tendency to regain balance as explained in section 3. 13 
 
Since the fixed exchange rate (e ) coincides with the free market exchange rate when 
0 Gt FX = , equation (17) suggests that the “exorbitant privilege” is utilised when e  is 
higher than the free market rate, or in other words, when the dollar is overvalued. 
Suppose e  is equal to the free market rate at time t-1, an overvaluation of the dollar 
may occur at time t if country 1 devalues its currency (e  becomes larger), and/or if 
the rate of money growth in country 2 is higher than that in country 1 ( 21 ππ > ).  
  Once the exorbitant privilege is utilised at time t (i.e.,  0 Gt FX > ), the money 
supply in country 1 increases by  Gt FX e  (assuming no sterilisation). Other things 
equal, the increase in country 1’s money supply lowers the market value of country 
1’s currency relative to the dollar, thereby driving the fixed exchange rate towards the 
free market rate in the next period. Therefore, in the absence of continued devaluation 
by country 1 or excess money growth in country 2, there is a tendency for external 
imbalances to correct themselves. This suggests that if external imbalances persist, it 
is likely that the policies in the periphery country or the centre country or both have 
kept the dollar over-valued.  
 
3.2.   Is the “exorbitant privilege” sustainable?  
  While government policies in the center country and/or in the periphery can 
lead to persistent external imbalances, it does not mean that “exorbitant privilege” is 
sustainable. A necessary condition for the “exorbitant privilege” is that the periphery 
country is willing to use the dollar as its reserve currency. An important reason why 
the  dollar  is chosen as the reserve  currency is that it is perceived to be a stable 
currency based on past experiences. If, as shown above,  the  utilisation of  the 
“exorbitant  privilege”  requires a continued over-valuation of the dollar, then the 14 
 
process of utilising the “exorbitant privilege” weakens the very foundation which 
supports the dollar as a reserve currency, therefore the system cannot be sustainable in 
the long run.   
  The use of the “exorbitant privilege” also has other consequences that lower 
the sustainability of the system. From the periphery country’s perspective, the 
“exorbitant advantage” leads to a continued increase in its foreign exchange reserves 
which over time tend to go above its desired level. As the increase in reserves is lent 
back to the central country on an indefinite basis, it leads to the peculiar direction of 
long-term capital flow from the relatively poor periphery country to the relatively rich 
centre country, and since the capital flow is the outcome of a net flow of goods in the 
opposite direction, it has the effect of transferring real resources from the periphery to 
the centre.  
  While the centre country benefits from the real resource transfer in the short 
run, there are long run costs. First of all, the flip side of the increase in reserves by the 
periphery country is the centre country’s accumulation of debt. Although the debt is 
denominated in dollars  and has no well-defined time frame  for net repayment, 
sovereign debt problems can escalate and result in financial crises as the history of the 
last eight centuries amply testifies (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Secondly, the use of 
the “exorbitant privilege” also leads to a change in sectoral competition in country 2. 
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which implies that if the “exorbitant privilege” is at work, then country 2 has a lower 
proportion of resources devoted to the tradable sector relative to country 1. In other 
words, the use of the “exorbitant privilege”  results in a change in the sectoral 
composition in the centre country in favour of the non-tradable sector at the expense 
of the tradeable sector. This is politically undesirable as it raises concerns about the 
“hollowing out” of the manufacturing sector in the centre country.  The sectoral 
composition bias is also economically inefficient as it is driven by debts other than 
comparative advantage, and entails future adjustment costs to the extent that the bias 
has to be corrected when debts are eventually paid. 
 
3.3.   What would happen if the “exorbitant privilege” were removed? 
If, as argued above, the “exorbitant privilege” cannot be sustained in the long run, the 
logical next question is what would happen if it were removed.  By the removal of the 
“exorbitant privilege”, we mean that the standing of the dollar as a reserve currency is 
in question and the periphery country not only stops accumulating dollar reserves, but 
also gradually reduces its dollar reserves over time. As the dollar reserves are held in 
the form of the centre country’s government bonds, a reduction of reserves amounts to 
demanding the centre country’s government to repay its debt. The centre country’s 
government may raise taxes to repay the debt (case 1), or it may simply print money 
to meet its debt obligations since its debt is denominated in dollars (case 2). In the 
following we present two simple models to illustrate what would likely happen to the 
economies of the centre and the periphery countries in these two cases.  16 
 
  For simplicity of illustration, our models assume: (1) the government of the 
periphery country an equal amount of principal in each period; and (2) the  debt 
repayments  are distributed equally to citizens of the periphery country in transfer 
payments.  
  Consider case 1 where debt repayments by country 2 are financed by taxes. 
The model for case 1 is similar to that presented in section 2 except for 3 differences.   
  First, an individual consumer in country 1 now receives a transfer payment 
which changes the foreign exchange component of the budget constraint. The decision 
problem of the representative consumer is: 
1, 1 1 1
1
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subject to the budget constraint: 
domestic currency: 
1 1 11 xt t z t t t It p x p z w eFX += − ,       








= + , 
where  1 / t RN ∆ is the per capita transfer payment.  
  Second, an individual consumer in country 2 now has to pay a tax to fund the 
debt repayment. The decision problem of the representative consumer is:  
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subject to the budget constraint: 
2 2 2 22
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where  2 / t RN ∆ is the per capita tax imposed for the purpose of debt repayment. 17 
 
  Third,  the periphery country no longer intervenes  in the foreign exchange 
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= ,                  (23) 
which determines the free market exchange rate  t e .   
Correspondingly,  country 1’s money supply equation becomes:   
1 1 1( 1) (1 ) tt mm π − = +                    (24) 
  Now consider case 2 where country 2’s government simply discharges its debt 
obligations with “printed” dollars. The model for case 2 differs from that for case 1 in 
two aspects.  First, consumers in country 2 are no longer required to pay tax to fund 
the debt repayments, thus the decision problem for the representative consumer in 
country 2 is: 
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subject to budget constraint: 
2 2 2 22
xt
t yt t z t t t
p
x py pz w
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++=  
Secondly, the dollar “printing” changes country 2’s money supply, which becomes:   
2 2 2( 1) (1 ) t tt m mR π − = + +∆.                (26) 
  We solve for the equilibrium for each of the models  outlined above and 
present the solutions in Table 2.  Based on the results in Table 2, we investigate how 
the economies would respond to the removal of the “exorbitant privilege”, focusing 
on the exchange rate, the terms of trade, and sectoral composition in each country. 
  Intuitively, the removal of the “exorbitant privilege” means that the demand 
for the dollar would fall, therefore the value of the dollar would fall as well. The value 18 
 
of the dollar would fall by more if country 2 also increases its supply of dollar to 
discharge its debts. As shown in Table 2, the exchange rates under the two cases are: 
Case 1:  
2 1 1( 1)
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Case 2:  
2 1 1( 1)
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From equation (17), we know that for the “exorbitant privilege” to work, the dollar 
needs to be overvalued, that is,  
2 1 1( 1)















.                            (29) 
It is easy to show that  
12 () () tt ee e >>.                  (30) 
Inequality (30) implies that if the “exorbitant privilege” were removed, the dollar 
would depreciate in value; and that the dollar would depreciate more in the case 2 
(where country 2 resorts to money printing to meet its debt obligations) than in case 1 
(where debt repayment is financed by tax revenue).   
  Now consider the terms of trade. From Table 1, we have the prices for tradable 
goods in the model of the “exorbitant privilege”: 
1 1 2 1 1( 1) 1 1 2 2 2( 1)
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where subscript ep indicates the “exorbitant privilege”. 
From Table 2, we have the prices for tradable goods in the two models with the 
removal of the “exorbitant privilege”:  19 
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where subscripts 1 and 2  indicate case 1 and case 2, respectively. 
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Equations (35) and (36) suggest that the removal of the “exorbitant privilege” would 
leads to a fall in country 1’s terms of trade; and the fall would be more pronounced in 
case 2 than in case 1. The fall in country 1’ terms of trade is driven by a change in 
relative demand for goods X and Y due to income changes in country 1 and country 2. 
The relative price change is larger in case 2 because the increase in money supply in 
country 2 further drives up the price of good Y.  
  Finally we consider how each country’s sector composition (as described by 
the ratio of labor employed in the tradable sector relative to that in the non-tradable 
sector) would respond to a removal of the “exorbitant advantage”. From Table 1, we 
have each country’s sector composition in the model of the “exorbitant privilege”: 
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Country 2:  
2 3 2 2 2( 1) 2 3 1 1( 1)
2 3 2 2 2( 1) 2 3 1 1( 1)
(2 ) (1 ) (1 )
()






α α π αα π






.    (38) 20 
 
From Table 2, we have each country’s sector composition with the removal of the 
“exorbitant privilege” in case 1 and case 2:  
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Inequalities (43) and (44) suggest that with the removal of the “exorbitant privilege”, 
labour resources would move away from the tradable sector (producing good X) in 
country 1 and move towards the tradable sector (producing good Y) in country 2. The 
changes in sectoral composition are driven by changes in relative demand for good X 
and good Y. The extent of change in sector composition would be smaller in case 2 
than in case 1 because in case 2, debt repayment financed by dollar “printing” drives 21 
 
up of the price of good Y,  therefore the relative demand increase for good Y is 
smaller.    
  
4.   Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have presented a set of three simple models to study how the 
“exorbitant advantage” works, whether it is sustainable, and what would be the likely 
consequences if it were removed.  We have shown that the presence of the “exorbitant 
privilege” is an indication of the over-valuation of the dollar which may be caused by 
policies in the periphery and/or the center country. We have argued that the 
“exorbitant privilege” is unsustainable in the long run, and that its removal would 
likely lead to a dollar depreciation, a change in the terms of trade against the 
periphery, and a change in sector composition in favour of the tradable sector in the 
center country and in favour of the non-tradable sector in the periphery. 
  Our model has some simplifying assumptions which we hope to relax in future 
research. Although relaxing these assumptions does not qualitatively change the main 
conclusions of the paper, it will give us a better representation  of the economic 
phenomena we want to study so that we can gain a deeper understanding of them. For 
example,  in this paper we assume no private lending or borrowing. This greatly 
simplifies the model as the consumers’ decisions become time independent. With the 
inclusion of private lending and borrowing in the model, the extent of the “exorbitant 
privilege” may be greater because the capital flowing into the center country can be 
used to finance both the center country’s current account deficit and its external asset 
acquisition, enabling the center country to become the world’s “venture capitalist” 
(Gourinchas and Rey, 2005).  22 
 
  Another simplifying assumption in this paper is that there  is no private 
demand for money therefore money does not enter the consumers’ utility function. 
Under the dollar standard, there is a demand for dollars in the periphery but virtually 
no demand for the periphery countries’ currencies in the center country. If this 
asymmetry in money demand is included in the model, a higher monetary growth rate 
in the center country (which results in the utilisation of the “exorbitant privilege”) can 
lead to a greater resource transfer from the periphery to the center country. This is 
because higher money growth leads to higher prices which increase the transaction 
demand for dollars in the periphery, and this increase in demand for dollar holdings 
needs to be met by additional exports earnings (Cheng and Zhang, forthcoming).  
  Finally, we assume no sterilisation following the periphery country’s purchase 
of dollars in the foreign exchange market. With the introduction of a partial (but not 
complete) sterilisation, it will slow down but not stop the process through which the 
fixed exchange rate approaches the free market level, consequently the exorbitant 
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Table 1. Solutions for the model of “Exorbitant Privilege” 
  Equilibrium solutions 
Purchase of “dollars” 
by country 1’s central 
bank 
1 2 2( 1) 2 1 1( 1)
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Table 2. Equilibrium Solutions for the models of debt repayment 
  Case 1  Case 2 
Exchange rate 
2 1 1( 1)
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